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LET STOCKHOLDERS DECIDE: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
MARYLAND DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY 
STATUTE OF 1988 
I. INTRODUCTION 
James J. Hanks, Jr.t 
Larry P. Scrigginst 
The Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988 (the Statute), en-
acted by the General Assembly of Maryland as emergency legislation 
early in the 1988 session and signed by Governor Schaefer on February 
18, 1988, arose out of the crisis in the markets for director and officer 
(D&O) liability insurance in the mid-1980's. During this period, a com-
bination of factors caused sharp increases in the cost of D&O liability 
insurance and led, in many cases, to its unavailability at any price. Con-
tributing to these developments were the surging market for takeovers, 
the increasing number of highly visible companies becoming financially 
distressed, particularly in the banking and energy industries, and world-
wide reduced underwriting capacity in the property and casualty indus-
try. These factors led to an increased demand for coverage by insureds 
and an increased perception of risk by insurers, which further decreased 
underwriting capacity among insurers. Many carriers left the field alto-
gether, reducing already-limited capacity and further increasing upward 
pressure on premiums.' 
As the number and size of takeovers and troubled companies rose, 
the courts became increasingly willing to second-guess directors' deci-
sions, culminating in the well-known case of Smith v. Van Gorkom. 2 In 
that case, the Supreme Court of Delaware held the directors of Trans 
Union Corporation liable for damages approaching $50 million for ap-
proving a negotiated merger without sufficient information and delibera-
tion, even though the price offered was nearly 50% higher than the 
recent market price for Trans Union's stock and even though the invest-
ment bankers had been unsuccessful in obtaining a still higher price. 3 
t A.B., 1964, Princeton University; LL.B., 1967, University of Maryland; LL.M., 
1969, Harvard University. Partner, Weinberg and Greeri, Baltimore, Maryland. 
Mr. Hanks was Chairman of the Director Liability Subcommittee, Committee on 
Corporate Laws, Section of Corporations, Banking and Business Law, Maryland 
State Bar Association. The Director Liability Subcommittee drafted the bills that 
became the Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988. 
~ A.B., 1958, Middlebury College; J.D., 1961, University of Chicago. Partner, Piper 
& Marbury, Baltimore, Maryland. Mr. Scriggins was a member of the Director 
Liability Subcommittee. 
1. For further discussion of the D&O liability insurance market in the mid-1980s, see 
JOHNSTON, CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS, IN PRI-
VATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS IN 1986, § 11.05[1] (J. Moss ed. 1986). 
2. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
3. For further discussion of the Trans Union and post-Trans Union cases, see Note, 
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Although the court specifically reaffirmed the gross negligence standard 
for directors' liability for money damages, 4 at least one trial court in 
Maryland has suggested that the ambit of what constitutes gross negli-
gence has expanded. 5 
The Van Gorkom decision was widely viewed, especially in the busi-
ness community and by the insurance industry, as broadening the expo-
sure of directors of corporations to personal liability for money damages. 
The fact that significant money damages could be imposed upon corpo-
rate directors based upon the facts of the Van Gorkom case led many 
directors, insurance companies and others to conclude that establishing 
the gross negligence standard was suddenly much easier than prior to 
Van Gorkom. 
In addition to take over litigation, financially distressed companies 
have been another frequent source of litigation against directors and of-
ficers. In 1984, insurers paid approximately $25 million to settle stock-
holder suits alleging mismanagement by former directors and officers of 
The Wickes Companies.6 In Fox v. Chase Manhattan Corp.,7 the Dela-
ware Chancery Court approved a settlement of $32.5 million in a suit 
against Chase Manhattan Corporation and six of its officers arising out of 
the collapse of Drysdale Government Securities. A few months later, 
Seafirst Corp., a bank holding company headquartered in Seattle, and 
five of its officers settled a derivative suit for $110 million, 8 although the 
company agreed to limit its recovery to the proceeds of the insurance 
policies covering the officers. Even doing nothing can be the basis for 
liability. A United States court of appeals has held that a director who 
acquiesces in a breach of fiduciary duty by another director may be held 
jointly and severally liable for the breach.9 As the Van Gorkom court 
noted: "It is, of course, a fact of corporate life that today when faced 
with difficult or sensitive issues, directors often are subject to suit, irre-
spective of the decisions they make." 10 
D&O insurance carriers responded to the Van Gorkom decision and 
other litigation against directors and officers with sharp increases in the 
The Limitation of Directors' Liability: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 66 TEx. L. 
REV. 411, 418-29 (1987). 
4. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
5. Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund Corp. v. Seidel, No. 13408 (Cir. Ct. Montgom-
ery County, Md. Oct. 7, 1987) ("While gross negligence remains the standard of 
directorial culpability in the State, the gateway to that precinct is considerably less 
obstructed than might be supposed."); see also Director Roundtable: The D&O Cri-
sis and Board Liability, Directors Boards, at 12 (Summer 1986) (remarks of Bayless 
Manning). 
6. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 21, 1984, at 6, col. 4. 
7. No. 8192-85 (Del. Dec. 6, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file). 
8. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. SeaFirst Corp., No. C85-396R (W.D. Wash. 1986); 
Seafirst Lawsuit Settled, Am. Banker, July 9, 1986, at 3, col. 1. 
9. Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 782 F.2d 1031 (3d Cir. 1985). This citation refers to an 
unpublished opinion which may be found in LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file. 
10. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985). 
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cost of D&O coverage through higher premiums, narrower insuring 
clauses, broader exclusions, expanded deductibles and lower policy lim-
its. 11 Some carriers withdrew from the market altogether and some cor-
porations were unable to obtain D&O insurance at any price, increasing 
the anxiety of directors about the risks of their positions. It is likely that 
directors were also concerned not only about personal liability for money 
damages, but also about non-pecuniary costs of litigation such as damage 
to reputation, loss of time and distraction from other activities. Conse-
quently, outside directors of many publicly held corporations resigned, 
declined to stand for re-election or refused nomination - reversing a 
trend toward outside directors encouraged by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, the New York Stock Exchange and various 
commentators. 12 
Surging D&O insurance costs and the resulting difficulty in retain-
ing outside directors quickly led to action by state legislatures. The first 
state to respond was Indiana, 13 in April, 1986, followed by Delaware14 in 
June. The enactment of director liability legislation in Delaware caused 
many corporations chartered in other states to reincorporate in Dela-
ware.15 Today, more than forty other states have adopted legislation 
designed to reduce the risk of directors' personal liability for money 
damages. 16 
The two most common legislative approaches have been limitations 
on the personal liability of directors for money damages and expansion of 
the corporation's right to indemnify directors in derivative suits. Statu-
tory limitations on the personal liability of directors for money damages 
generally take three approaches: (1) "charter option" statutes (e.g., 
Maryland and Delaware) permitting stockholders to adopt charter provi-
sions limiting the liability of directors; (and, in some states, officers) for 
money damages in suits by the corporation or its stockholders; (2) "self-
executing" statutes (e.g., Indiana) adjusting the standard of conduct giv-
11. Crown Central Petroleum Corporation, headquartered in Baltimore, reported that 
its annual D&O liability insurance premium increased from $13,000 in 1984 to 
$1,300,000 in 1987- an increase of 10,000 percent. In addition, the limits of the 
policy were reduced from $30,000,000 to $10,000,000. Hanks, The Risk of Running 
a Company, The Baltimore Sun, May I, 1987, at llA, col. l. 
12. E.g., Corp. Officers & Directors Liability Litigation Rep. (Andrews) at 2,102 (Dec. 
10, 1986); Baum & Byrne, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 8, 1986, at 56; 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at Dl, col. 3. 
13. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-l(e) (Burns Supp. 1988). 
14. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986). For further discussion of the 
Delaware statute, see Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with 
a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42 Bus. 
LAW. 399 (1987). 
15. E.g., BancTec, Inc. (Tex.), Clorox Co. (Cal.), Genentech, Inc. (Cal.), Environmen-
tal Diagnostics, Inc. (Cal.), Microsoft Corp. (Wash.), Penn Central Corp. (Pa.), 
Hechinger Co. (D.C.) and Walt Disney Co. (Cal.). 
16. For a survey of this legislation, see Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Legislation on 
Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnfication, 43 Bus. LAw. 1207 
(1988). 
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ing rise to liability for money damages in suits by the corporation or the 
stockholders (and, in some states, third parties); and (3) in Virginia only, 
a statutory cap on the liability of directors and officers for money dam-
ages to the corporation or stockholders.J7 All three approaches exempt 
certain conduct from exculpation. 
In addition, many states, including Maryland, simultaneously 
amended their indemnification statutes, broadening the corporation's 
right to indemnify its directors and officers. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The standard of conduct for directors of Maryland corporations is 
set forth in section 2-405.1(a) of the Maryland General Corporation Law 
(MGCL), 18 enacted in 1976. The statute requires that a director perform 
his duties: 
(1) In good faith; 
(2) In a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best 
fnterest of the corporation; and 
(3) With the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a 
like position would use under similar circumstances. 19 
Prior to 1988, section 2-405.1(c) provided: 
A person who performs his duties in accordance with the stan-
dard provided in this section has no liability by reason of being 
or having been a director of a corporation, unless, in a situation 
to which § 2-419(d) [relating to interested director transac-
tions] of this subtitle applies, a contract or transaction is deter-
mined not to have been fair and reasonable to the 
corporation. 20 
In cases decided both before and after the enactment of section 2-405.1, 
Maryland courts have held that the standard for personal liability of di-
rectors of Maryland corporations for money damages is apparently 
"gross or culpable negligence."21 Inexplicably, the court of appeals has 
17. VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1988). 
18. All statutory references hereafter, except as noted, refer to the MGCL section. 
19. Section 2-405.l(a) was based upon section 8.30(a) of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act. The official comment to section 8.30(a) states that section 8.30(a) "does 
not use the term 'fiduciary' ... because that term could be confused with the unique 
attributes and obligations of a fiduciary imposed by the Jaw of trusts, some of which 
are not appropriate for directors of a corporation." REv. MoDEL BusiNESS CORP. 
AcT § 8.30(a) official comment (1984). 
20. Section 2-405.1. 
21. Devereux v. Berger, 264 Md. 20, 32, 284 A.2d 605, 612 (1971); Parish v. Maryland 
& Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 74, 242 A.2d 512, 540 (1968); Mountain 
Manor Realty, Inc. v. Buccheri, 55 Md. App. 185, 194, 461 A.2d 45, 51 (1983). A 
bridge between the provisions of section 2-405.1 (including section 2-405.l(c), both 
before and after the 1988 amendments) and the judicial "gross and/or culpable neg-
ligence" standard may be supported, albeit indirectly, by the application of the busi-
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referred both to "gross and culpable" negligence anq to "gross or culpa-
ble" negligence. 22 
A. The 1987 Bill 
In June, 1986, the Subcommittee on Director Liability of the Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporations, Banking and 
Business Law (now the Section of Business Law) of the Maryland State 
Bar Association (MSBA Subcommittee) was appointed to consider direc-
tor liability legislation for Maryland. 23 The MSBA Subcommittee met 
frequently throughout the summer and early fall of 1986 and reviewed 
the Indiana and Delaware statutes as well as legislation in other states. 
In November, 1986, the MSBA Subcommittee issued a report24 propos-
ing a "self-executing" statute, based on the Indiana statute. Early in 
1987 the MSBA Subcommittee's recommended legislation was intro-
duced in the Senate of Maryland as Senate Bill 223,25 sponsored by Sen-
ate President Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr. as an administration bill, and 
in the House of Delegates as House Bill 242, sponsored by House Judici-
ary Committee Chairman William S. Horne. The two bills are hereafter 
referred to collectively as the "1987 Bill." 
The 1987 Bill provided that, in order for a director to be liable for 
damages, his action or failure to act must constitute: 
1. A breach of the standard of conduct set forth in section 
2-405.1(a), if applicable, constituting "willful misconduct or de-
liberate recklessness;" 
2. Actual receipt of "an improper benefit in money, prop-
erty or services;" 
3. Assent to declaration of a dividend or distribution con-
trary to the provisions of the MGCL; or 
4. "Willful misconduct or recklessness" in any case to 
which section 2-405.1 does not apply. 26 
ness judgment rule presumption. The official comment to section 8.30 of the 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, on which section 2-405.1 was based, 
makes it clear that, if the standard of section 8.30(a) is met, the director is exoner-
ated and there is no need to consider possible application of the business judgment 
rule; if that standard is not met, then consideration of the business judgment rule 
comes into play and may protect the director. 
22. Parish, 250 Md. at 74-76, 242 A.2d at 540-41 (emphasis added); see also Parish v. 
Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 261 Md. 618, 681, 277 A.2d 19, 48, cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). 
23. The members of the subcommittee were Arthur F. Fergenson, James J. Hanks, Jr. 
(Chairman), Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Larry P. Scriggins, J. W. Thompson Webb 
and John J. Woloszyn. 
24. See MARYLAND STATE BAR Ass'N, SECTION ON CORP., BANKING AND Bus. L., 
COMM. ON CORP. LAW, SUBCOMM. ON DIRECTOR LIABILITY REP. (Nov. 16, 1987) 
[hereinafter DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT) reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 254 
(1989) ("Appendix" to this article). 
25. S.B. 223, 1987 Sess. (1987) 
26. /d. 
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The 1987 Bill's limitation of liability was "self-executing" in the sense 
that it applied automatically to directors of all Maryland corporations 
without any requirement of the stockholders' approval. It also applied to 
all suits for damages, whether by the corporation, the stockholders (di-
rectly or derivatively) or third parties. 
The MSBA Subcommittee found that a self-executing standard of 
"willful misconduct or deliberate recklessness" was desirable for several 
reasons. First, it added greater clarity and certainty to the law than is 
available under judicial precedents. Second, it followed self-executing di-
rector liability statutes already enacted in Indiana and Louisiana, thereby 
enabling Maryland courts to take advantage of cases decided in those 
states under this standard. Third, it tended to discourage directors of 
Maryland-chartered corporations from recommending reincorporation 
in other states because it assured directors that they would not be held 
personally liable for money damages for simple negligence. Fourth, 
newly established businesses, perceiving Maryland as having an up-to-
date corporation statute, would be more likely to incorporate here. Fifth, 
a self-executing statute would add to the perception of Maryland as a 
state with a favorable and responsive business climate. Finally, it would 
encourage directors of Maryland-chartered corporations to continue 
serving as directors.27 
Section 2-405.2(b) of the 1987 Bill gave the corporation the right to 
opt out of the self-executing provision of section 2-405.2(a), except for 
liability arising out of (1) actual receipt of "an improper benefit in 
money, property or services" or (2) a judgment establishing "active and 
deliberate dishonesty [that] was material to the cause of action so 
adjudicated .... " 
The self-executing revised liability provision was set forth as a pro-
posed new section 2-405.2 in order to eliminate any argument that, by its 
inclusion in section 2-405.1, the statutory limitation on liability was in-
tended to apply only to a director's breach of the standard of care set 
forth in section 2-405.1(a) and not also to a breach of the duty of loyalty 
or some other duty. The words "willful" and "deliberate" were intended 
to indicate a requirement of specific intent to cause harm, as opposed to a 
general intent to perform the acts or omissions giving rise to the injury. 
The 1987 Bill also added a new section 2-105(b)(8) authorizing the 
charter of a Maryland corporation to contain a provision "which varies 
in accordance with § 2-405.2(b) of this title the standards for liability of 
the directors of a corporation for money damages." Thus, even though 
proposed section 2-405.2 was self-executing, a corporation could opt out 
of it by including a provision in the original articles of incorporation or 
by amending its charter. The 1987 Bill also deleted the reference to in-
27. For a discussion of the rationale for the self-executing Wisconsin director liability 
statute by one of its drafters, see Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Legislation on 
Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207, 
1234 n.68 (1988). 
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terested-director transactions in the liability limiting provision of section 
2-405.1(c). 
Along with the proposed amendment relating to the standard for 
director's liability for money damages, the 1987 Bill contained four 
amendments to section 2-418 relating to indemnification: 
1. Presumption of Non-Compliance With Indemnification Standard 
Section 2-418(b)(3) previously provided that termination of any pro-
ceeding by a judgment, order, settlement, conviction or a nolo contendere 
plea created a rebuttable presumption that the director did not meet the 
requisite standard for indemnification set forth in section 2-418(b)(1).28 
The Subcommittee recommended that, as to convictions and nolo con-
tendere pleas, the rebuttable presumption should continue, but that as to 
judgments, orders and settlements, there should be no presumption one 
way or the other. 
2. Non-Exclusivity 
Under prior section 2-418(g), any contract between a corporation 
and its directors providing for indemnification was required to be "con-
sistent with" the indemnification permitted by section 2-418. In the 1987 
Bill, however, section 2-418(g) provided that any statutory indemnifica-
tion "shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights, by indemnifica-
tion or otherwise, to which a director may be entitled under the charter, 
the bylaws, a resolution of stockholders or directors, an agreement or 
otherwise .... " 
3. Advance Payment of Expenses 
Prior section 2-418(f) required, as a prerequisite to advance pay-
ment of expenses during the pendency of a proceeding to which a direc-
tor was a party, a determination in each case that indemnification would 
not be precluded under the facts known at the time of the determination. 
The 1987 Bill eliminated the necessity for this determination and author-
ized a corporation to adopt a general provision for advance payment of 
expenses in its charter, or bylaws or by contract. 
28. Prior to 1988, section 2-418(b )( 1) permitted a corporation to indemnify a director if 
he: 
(i) Acted in good faith; 
(ii) Reasonably believed: 
1. In the case of conduct in the director's official capacity with the corporation, 
that the conduct was in the best interests of the corporation; and 
2. In all other cases, that the conduct was at least not opposed to the best inter-
ests of the corporation; and 
(iii) In the case of any criminal proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe that 
the conduct was unlawful. 
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4. Determination of Permissibility of Indemnification 
Section 2-418(e) formerly provided that indemnification must be 
"authorized in a specific case .... " The 1987 Bill proposed substituting 
the words "for a specific proceeding" for the words "in the specific case." 
In the Senate, Senate Bill 223 was assigned to the Judicial Proceed-
ings Committee (Senate Committee), which held a hearing on February 
4, 1987, at which representatives of the MSBA and various business or-
ganizations testified in support of the bill. Following the hearing, the 
Senate Committee made five amendments to the bill. 
First, the "willful misconduct or deliberate recklessness" standard 
was eliminated in favor of "a standard of misconduct or recklessness 
amounting to gross negligence." This amendment effectively eviscerated 
the bill. Indeed, it would have made liability for money damages even 
easier to prove than under the "gross or culpable negligence" standard 
adopted by the Maryland courts.29 Second, the Senate Committee added 
an exception to the bill for actions brought against directors of a state-
regulated savings and loan association or credit union that did not have 
federal insurance of accounts. Third, the Senate Committee also 
amended the bill to continue the presumption of non-compliance with 
the statutory standards for indemnification in the case of a conviction or 
a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent. Fourth, the Senate Committee 
amended the non-exclusivity provision of section 2-418(g). Finally, the 
Senate Committee added an effective date provision providing that the 
liability limitation provisions would apply "only to actions arising from 
events or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this Act" 
and that the amendments to section 2-418 would "apply only to indemni-
fication granted on or after the effective date of this Act, whether the 
underlying events, omissions, or proceedings occurred prior or subse-
quent thereto." 
Meanwhile, in the House of Delegates, House Bill 242 was assigned 
to the Judiciary Committee (House Committee) which held a hearing on 
February 17, 1987, at which representatives of the MSBA and the busi-
ness community testified in support of the bill. Only the Maryland Trial 
Lawyers Association opposed it. Members of the House Committee ex-
pressed concern that the bill was "self-executing" and denied stockhold-
ers the opportunity to participate in the decision whether or not to limit 
directors' liability. Members also stated reservations about the applica-
tion of the bill to suits by third parties. Following the hearing, the House 
Committee gave House Bill 242 an unfavorable report. On March 5, 
1987, the Senate passed Senate Bill223 but when it was introduced in the 
House of Delegates and referred to the House Committee, it too received 
an unfavorable report. 
The reaction of the business community and the press to the House 
Committee's action was strongly negative. Henry A. Rosenberg, Jr., 
29. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
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Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Crown Central 
Petroleum Corporation, told the annual meeting of stockholders that 
management was "seriously considering" reincorporating in Delaware if 
the legislature did not pass director liability legislation in the 1988 ses-
sion.30 Donald P. Hutchinson, a former member of both the House of 
Delegates and the Senate, and President of Maryland Economic Growth 
Associates, Inc., representing over 75 major corporations, stated that 
many companies were "disenchanted [that] the legislature failed to rec-
ognize the problem but most are saying they are willing to give the legis-
lature another chance to deal with the issue."31 Jerome W. Geckle, 
Chairman of the Board of PHH Group, Inc., said that he would "be 
forced to take a hard look elsewhere" if the General Assembly did not 
pass adequate legislation. 32 The Baltimore Sun added its voice on May 
12 with an editorial entitled "Stop the Move to Delaware!" stating that it 
was "encouraging to learn that members of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee are having second thoughts about their earlier decision to kill leg-
islation that would have reformed Maryland corporate directors' liability 
law. . . . The sooner this bill is enacted, the better."33 
B. The 1988 Bill 
In late May, following the adjournment of the General Assembly, 
the chairman of the MSBA Subcommittee met with Chairman Horne of 
the House Committee and with Committee Counsel Douglas Nestor. 
Chairman Horne reiterated his committee's concern over the stockholder 
participation and third-party issues. He was told that the MSBA Sub-
committee was willing to redraft the 1987 Bill to require any liability-
limitation provision to be included in the corporation's charter (either as 
part of the original articles of incorporation or by amendment approved 
by the stockholders), and to eliminate limitation of liability in suits by 
third parties. Chairman Home was also informed that the MSBA Sub-
committee wished to include officers as a protected group in any new bill. 
These and other issues were discussed at a hearing of the House 
Committee on June 2, 1987. Alan M. Rifkin, then Chief Legislative Of-
ficer to Governor Schaefer, and other representatives of the Schaefer Ad-
ministration, the business community and the MSBA testified in support 
of the revised liability-limitation legislation. Most of the discussion fo-
cused on the need for stockholder approval, the standard of liability, 
third-party suits, officers and standard of proof. Chairman Home and 
other legislators who had voted against House Bill 242 expressed support 
for new legislation requiring stockholder approval and eliminating liabil-
ity limitation for third-party suits. 
30. The Baltimore Sun, May 3, 1987, at 5F, col. 1. 
31. /d., col. 2; see also Washington Business, Washington Post, May 4, 1987, at 38, col. 
3. 
32. The Baltimore Sun, May 3, 1987, at 5F, cols. 2-3. 
33. The Baltimore Sun, May 12, 1987, at lOA, col. 1. 
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In the succeeding months, the MSBA Subcommittee prepared a new 
report34 recommending a modified bill (the 1988 Bill) with five principal 
changes from the 1987 Bill. First, any provision for limitation of liability 
must be included in the corporation's charter (the charter option). This 
revision reflected the concern of the House Committee that liability limi-
tation should not be self-executing. Second, liability limitation for third 
party suits was eliminated because third parties do not participate in the 
liability limitation decision and, therefore, should not be precluded from 
recovery. Third, officers were included along with directors as a pro-
tected group. Fourth, the scope of possible liability limitation was ex-
panded to include any conduct except (1) actual receipt of an improper 
benefit in money, property or services and (2) active and deliberate dis-
honesty established by an adjudication to be material to the cause of ac-
tion adjudicated. Finally, the standard of permissible indemnification 
under section 2-418(b)(1) was broadened. Thus, the MSBA Subcommit-
tee acceded to the House Committee's disapproval of self-executing lia-
bility limitation and inclusion of third-party suits in exchange for 
inclusion of officers as a protected group, a broader standard of possible 
liability limitation and a broader standard for permissible indemnifica-
tion. The 1988 Bill also excluded suits brought by the State of Maryland 
or by a receiver, conservator or depositor against a director or officer of 
state-chartered banks, credit unions or savings and loan associations and 
their subsidiaries. National banks and bank holding companies were not 
included in the exception. 
In October, the House Committee held a work session on the 1988 
Bill at which MSBA and business community representatives testified. 
By this time, however, several Maryland corporations had reincorpo-
rated in other states. 35 
The 1988 Bill was introduced as an emergency measure in the 
House as House Bill 273, sponsored by House Speaker R. Clayton 
Mitchell, Jr. as an administration bill, and in the Senate as Senate Bill 
223, sponsored by Senate President Miller as an administration bill. 
House Bill 273 was referred to the House Committee, which held a 
hearing on January 19, 1988. Representatives of the Schaefer Adminis-
tration, the MSBA, the Maryland Chamber of Commerce, Maryland 
Economic Growth Associates, Inc., the Greater Baltimore Committee, 
the Greater Washington Board of Trade and other organizations testified 
in favor of the bill. Again, the only testimony in opposition came from 
the Maryland Trial Lawyers Association. Two days later, The Baltimore 
Sun weighed in with an editorial recommending "a ringing endorse-
ment" by the House Committee. 36 
On January 26, 1988, the House Committee rejected an amendment 
34. See DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 24, at 254-55. 
35. E.g., Fairchild Industries, Inc., Luskin's, Inc., McKesson Corp. and Penta Systems 
International, Inc. 
36. Editorial, Spotlight on Judiciary, The Baltimore Sun, Jan. 21, 1988, lOA, col. l. 
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to substitute the exceptions in the Delaware statute for the improper ben-
efit and active and deliberate dishonesty exceptions in House Bill 273. 
The House Committee also rejected an amendment to delete officers from 
the bill. The House Committee then gave House Bill 273 a favorable 
report, without amendments, by a margin of twenty-one yeas, no nays 
and one abstention. Two days later, the House of Delegates overwhelm-
ingly rejected the same two amendments rejected by the House Commit-
tee and gave final approval, without amendments, to House Bill 273 by a 
margin of 121 yeas, 1 nay and 19 not voting. On February 18, the Senate 
approved House Bill 273 by a vote of forty-four yeas, one nay and two 
not voting. 
In the Senate, Senate Bill 223 was referred to the Senate Committee, 
which held a hearing on January 26, 1988 at which representatives of the 
Schaefer Administration and many of the same organizations that ap-
peared before the House Committee testified in support of Senate Bill 
223. There was no opposing testimony. On January 29, the Senate Com-
mittee gave Senate Bill 223 a favorable report, without amendments, by a 
margin of ten yeas, no nays and one absent. On February 4, the Senate 
gave final approval, without amendments, to Senate Bill 223 by a margin 
of thirty-eight yeas, three nays, five excused and one not voting. The 
House of Delegates approved Senate Bill 223 on February 18 by a vote of 
109 yeas, 6 nays, 1 excused and 25 not voting. 
As an emergency bill, the legislation became law on February 18, 
1988, the date it was signed by Governor Schaefer,37 who cited the stat-
ute as "a good example of success through cooperation" between the Ad-
ministration and the General Assembly. 38 
According to uncodified section 2 of the Statute, the liability-limita-
tion provisions "apply only to actions arising from events or omissions 
occurring on or after" February 18, 1988. Thus, even though a liability-
limitation charter amendment may not have any effect on events or omis-
sions occurring prior to the February 18, 1988 enactment date, the Stat-
ute permits the exculpatory provisions, after stockholder adoption and 
upon filing and acceptance for record of articles of amendment, to relate 
back to events or omissions occurring on or after February 18, 1988. 
The indemnification provisions, which do not require stockholder action, 
may "apply only to indemnification granted on or after" February 18, 
1988, without regard to when the underlying events or omissions 
occurred. 
37. 1988 Md. Laws chs. 3, 4. The governor signed both H. B. 273 (which became chap-
ter 3) and S.B. 223 (which became chapter 4); the bills were identical. Chapter 3 is 
reprinted as Addendum I to the Appendix of this article. 
38. The Sun, Feb. 19, 1988, at IF, col. 6. 
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III. OPERATION AND EFFECT 
A. Liability Limitation 
The liability-limitation provisions of the Statute are, like the statutes 
in Delaware and thirty other states, a "charter option" law. The Statute 
does nothing more than authorize the corporation, either in its original 
articles of incorporation or by charter amendment, to limit the liability of 
its directors and officers for money damages, with certain exceptions, in 
suits by the corporation or its stockholders, but not in suits brought by 
third parties. In a sense, the Statute is not a major expansion of the 
stockholders' authority. Section 2-104(b)(l) of the MGCL, like most 
state corporation statutes,39 authorizes the charter to include "[a]ny pro-
vision not inconsistent with law which defines, limits, or regulates the 
powers of the corporation, its directors and stockholders .... " If it were 
not for the fact that "law" probably includes judicial decisions permitting 
recovery of money damages upon a showing of gross and culpable negli-
gence40 (and also that section 2-104(b)(l) does not refer to "liabilities" of 
directors or officers), the liability of directors and officers could probably 
be limited under existing section 2-104(b )(1) and the Statute would be 
unnecessary. Moreover, other provisions of the MGCL empower the 
stockholders to elect and remove directors,41 approve mergers and other 
major corporate transactions42 and dissolve the corporation.43 All of 
these actions are far more common than suits by the corporation or its 
stockholders against directors and typically involve immediate eco11omic 
consequences to the stockholders far greater than limiting the directors' 
or officers' liability. Thus, in authorizing the stockholders to limit the 
monetary liability of directors and officers to the corporation and the 
stockholders, the Statute is only a minimal expansion of the stockhold-
ers' existing powers. 
In any event, without affirmative action by the corporation, the Stat-
ute will have no effect on the directors' or officers' monetary liability. 
Moreover, the liability limitation provisions of the Statute have no effect 
on the liability of directors or officers for equitable relief or on the right 
of the stockholders to remove directors44 or the right of directors to re-
move officers. 45 
1. Scope of Liability Limitation 
The exceptions to the Maryland charter option Statute in effect de-
fine the scope of the stockholders' right to limit the monetary liability of 
39. E.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 2.02(b)(2) (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 402(c) (McKinney Supp. 1989). 
40. See supra note 21. 
41. Section 2-406 (1985). 
42. !d. §§ 3-101 to 3-105 (1985 & Supp. 1988). 
43. !d. §§ 3-401 to 3-403, 3-413 (1985 & Supp. 1988). 
44. !d. § 2-406 ( 1985). 
45. !d. § 2-413(c). 
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the corporation's directors and officers from the corporation or its stock-
holders. The ambiguity of some of the Delaware exceptions (especially 
breach of the duty of loyalty,46 acts or omissions not in good faith, and 
improper personal benefit) caused concern that they could be interpreted 
so broadly as to defeat the purpose of the Statute. Although many states 
have simply copied the Delaware statute in its entirety, including its ex-
ceptions, several of the more recent charter option states, now including 
Maryland, have adopted more targeted exceptions. 
As a result of the Maryland Statute's two very limited exceptions for 
improper personal benefit or profit and for active and deliberate dishon-
esty, stockholders of a Maryland corporation may eliminate the liability 
of its directors and officers for a broad range of conduct - including not 
only simple and gross negligence, but also intentional misconduct, bad 
faith, unlawful distributions,47 and violations of law- as long as it does 
not constitute actual receipt of an improper benefit or profit, or active 
and deliberate dishonesty. The two most important favorable differences 
between the exceptions in the Maryland and Delaware statutes are Mary-
land's limitation of the exception for improper receipt of a personal bene-
fit to its actual value, i.e., restitution, and Maryland's absence of a "duty 
of loyalty" exception. The narrowness and precision of the Maryland 
Statute's two exceptions make it possibly the most expansive corporate 
liability limitation statute in the nation. 
The Statute permits the stockholders to adjust the limitation of lia-
bility to themselves or the corporation to whatever degree they wish. 
Although stockholders of many corporations will want to take full ad-
vantage of the Statute, some corporations' stockholders may decide, for 
example, to limit liability only for directors and not officers, or only for 
gross negligence, or only up to a certain monetary amount, or only above 
a certain monetary amount, or only for suits by or in the right of the 
corporation and not for direct suits by stockholders. Indeed, the Statute 
permits the stockholders to expand the standard of liability, of directors 
and officers as previously established by judicial decisions. For example, 
46. The Delaware Supreme Court itself has had difficulty distinguishing the duty of care 
from the duty of loyalty. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 
506 A.2d 173, 175 (trial court held that "the Revlon directors had breached their 
duty of care"); id. at 179 (trial court held that "the Revlon directors had breached 
their duty of loyalty") (Del. 1986). In fact, the trial court held that "the Revlon 
Board failed in its fiduciary duty to the shareholders. . . . [I]ts performance did not 
conform to the other component of the business judgment rule - the duty of loy-
alty." MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 
(Del. Ch. 1985). For further discussion of the Rev/on case, see McDaniel, Bond-
holders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. LAW 205, 287 (1988); see also Fischel & 
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CoRNELL L. REV. 261, 291 (1986). 
47. In response to a question from Senator Norman R. Stone (D- Baltimore Co.) dur-
ing a work session of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee in February, 1988, 
on amendments to title 2, subtitle 3 of the MGCL, MSBA representatives stated 
that liability for unlawful distributions under new section 2-312 could be limited by 
a charter amendment adopted by a corporation pursuant to the Statute. 
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the Statute permits stockholders to hold directors monetarily liable for 
simple negligence. Contrary to Professor Sargent's suggestion in an ac-
companying article, 48 the Statute does not "diminish[ ] ... the value of 
the traditional distinction between [the duties of] care and loyalty .... " 
These duties will continue to be developed in suits by third parties, in 
suits by stockholders of corporations not adopting liability limitation 
provisions, in suits for equitable relief49 and in suits against directors and 
officers of state-chartered financial institutions excluded from the Statute. 
Finally, the Statute amended section 2-405.1(c) to eliminate its inap-
posite reference to section 2-419. Section 2-419 provides a procedure for 
insulating transactions between a corporation and a director from void-
ness or voidability and from recovery of damages from the director; it 
does not, however, provide for personal liability for directors. 50 More-
over, the issue addressed by section 2-419 relates to the duty of loyalty, 
whereas section 2-405.1 deals primarily with the duty of care. Accord-
ingly, the reference to section 2-419 in section 2-405.l(c) was never ap-
propriate and was therefore deleted by the Statute. 51 Thus, even if a 
corporation does not adopt a liability limitation charter provision (or 
adopts only a partial provision), section 2-405.1(c) will protect a director, 
but not necessarily an officer, from liability, both for money damages as 
well as equitable relief, if he performs his duties in accordance with the 
three-part standard of section 2-405.1(a). In addition, the director would 
have the benefit of the presumption of the business judgment rule, as 
indicated in the official comment to section 8.30(d) of the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act,52 on which section 2-405.1(c) was based. 
2. Officers 
Five states, including Maryland, now permit stockholders to limit 
the liability of officers. Since a charter option statute gives the stockhold-
ers the right to limit liability there is no logical policy reason for permit-
48. See Sargent, Two Cheers for the Maryland Directors' and Officers' Liability Statute, 
18 U. BALT. L. REV. 278, 300 (1989). 
49. In litigation testing the sufficiency of the deliberative process and the adequacy of 
price and other terms in takeovers, the most common and effective remedy is typi-
cally an injunction or writ of mandamus, not money damages. 
SO. The court of special appeals in Mountain Manor Realty, Inc. v. Buccheri, 55 Md. 
App. 185, 195, 198, 461 A.2d 45, 51, 53 (1983), speaks confusingly about "viola-
tion" of section 2-419. In fact, section 2-419 cannot be "violated." It is a safe har-
bor both from voidness or voidability and from any liability to a director arising out 
of being a party to a contract or transaction with the corporation. The fact that a 
contract or other transaction does not meet the standards of section 2-419 does not 
mean that it is void, voidable, invalid or unenforceable; it means only that the con-
tract or transaction does not enjoy the statutory insulation from voidness or 
voidability. There may be other facts or circumstances that would shield it from 
voidness or voidability. 
5 l. Section 8.30(b) of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, the counterpart to 
section 2-40S.l(c), contains no similar reference to the Model Act counterpart of 
section 2-419. 
52. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 8.30(d) official comment (1984). 
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ting them to limit the liability of directors but not officers. Moreover, if 
plaintiffs are foreclosed only from suing directors, they will be increas-
ingly motivated to sue officers, particularly senior officers, in order to 
reach the D&O liability insurance policy. D&O insurers are more likely 
to reduce their premiums if they are assured that the liability of both 
directors and officers is limited. Furthermore, treating directors and of-
ficers alike for purposes of liability limitation is consistent with the iden-
tical treatment of directors and officers under Maryland's 
indemnification statute. 53 Finally, many of the matters typically submit-
ted to a board of directors originate among the officers and, if approved 
by the directors, are referred to the officers for implementation. They are 
entitled, if the stockholders so decide, to be protected to the same degree 
as directors. 
B. Indemnification. 
The Statute makes several amendments to the indemnification pro-
visions of section 2-418. 
1. Scope of Indemnification 
Formerly, section 2-418(b)(1) set forth the "good faith," "reason-
able belief" standard for the right of a corporation to indemnify its direc-
tors and officers. 54 The Statute amends section 2-418(b)(1) to permit a 
corporation to indemnify a director unless it is "proved" that the individ-
ual (1) acted "in bad faith" or with "active and deliberate dishonesty;" 
(2) "actually received an improper personal benefit in money, property or 
services;" or (3) "[i]n the case of any criminal proceeding, had reasonable 
cause to believe that [his] act or omission was unlawful."55 Thus, the 
requirement in section 2-418(e)(1) for a determination that the director 
"has met the standard of conduct set forth in subsection (b)" is initially 
satisfied simply by a determination that it has not yet been proved that 
the director's conduct fell within any of the three exceptions. Of course, 
if the proceeding eventually results in a determination that the director's 
conduct did fall within one of the three exceptions, then the director 
would be required, by the written undertaking required by section 2-
418(f)(1)(ii), to repay any expenses advanced during the course of the 
proceeding. The inclusion of the word "personal" in the phrase "im-
proper personal benefit" in section 2-418(b)(l)(ii), as opposed to the 
phrase "improper benefit or profit" in new section 2-405.2(a)(l), was not 
intended to have any substantive significance. The words "or profit" in 
53. Section 2-418(j)(l) (1985). 
54. Supra note 28. 
55. In 1989, the General Assembly amended section 2-418(b)(l) again, by substituting 
the word "established" for the word "proved" and the words "matter giving rise to" 
for the words "cause of action adjudicated in." The purpose of this amendment is 
to clarify that section 2-418(e)(l) applies to settlements as well as to adjudicated 
causes of action. 
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section 2-405.2(a)(1) were added to the 1988 Bill at the request of the 
Attorney General's Office; no request was made to include these words in 
section 2-418(b )( 1 )(ii). 
Because of the "bad faith" exception, the corporation's right to in-
demnify its directors and officers is slightly less expansive than the right 
of stockholders to limit their liability. This is appropriate in view of the 
fact that the corporation may indemnify directors and officers by board 
action without the participation of stockholders, whereas liability limita-
tion may be achieved only by stockholder action. 
The Statute also expands the scope of indemnification in derivative 
suits. Section 2-418(b)(2)(ii) formerly provided that indemnification in a 
derivative suit may be made only for reasonable expenses, but not if the 
individual was adjudged to be liable to the corporation (unless ordered by 
a court). The new Statute permits indemnification for amounts paid in 
settlement of derivative suits. This change should encourage settlements 
by no longer limiting indemnification to expenses. 
2. Presumption of Noncompliance with Indemnification Standard 
Prior to the passage of the D&O statute, Maryland was the only 
state that provided that termination of a proceeding by judgment, order, 
settlement, or conviction created a rebuttable presumption that the direc-
tor or officer did not meet the standard for indemnification in section 2-
418(b)(l). Consistent with the indemnification provisions of more than 
forty states, the Statute now provides that a judgment, order or settle-
ment does not create a presumption of non-compliance. A proceeding 
may be settled for many reasons having nothing to do with whether the 
director's conduct met the standard for indemnification. For example, a 
suit may be settled for its "nuisance" value at an amount that is less than 
the cost of litigation. There is no reason why a settlement should create a 
presumption that the director did not meet the standard for indemnifica-
tion in section 2-418(b)(l). Even a judgment adverse to the director may 
be entered for reasons other than his conduct as a director. Nonetheless, 
a conviction or nolo contendere plea continues to create the presumption. 
3. Determination of Permissibility of Indemnification 
Prior to the 1988 amendment, section 2-418(e) provided that indem-
nification must be "authorized in the specific case .... " The word "case" 
was never defined in the statute. Its use, especially in view of the defini-
tion of "proceeding," raised the question of whether indemnification for 
each payment of expenses must be separately authorized. Substituting 
the phrase "for a specific proceeding" for the phrase "in the specific 
case" resolves any question. 
4. Advance Payment of Expenses 
As a condition to advance payment of expenses, section 2-418(f)(l) 
formerly required a determination that indemnification would not be pre-
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eluded under the facts known at the time of the determination. This 
requirement has been eliminated. Instead, section 2-418(f)(3) now per-
mits a corporation to make general provision for advance payment of 
expenses in its charter or bylaws, by contract or in the manner specified 
in section 2-418(e). 
5. Non-Exclusivity 
Section 2-418(g) previously required that any contract between a 
corporation and the director or officer providing for indemnification 
must be "consistent with" the indemnification permitted by section 2-
418. This provision, patterned after section 8.58(a) of the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act, was much more restrictive than the compara-
ble provision in section 145(f) of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, which provides that the indemnification provided by statute "shall 
not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those seeking in-
demnification may be entitled under any bylaw, agreement, ... or other-
wise .... " Even the Delaware statute, however, could be read to limit 
any indemnification right (as opposed to "other right") to section 145. 
Section 2-418(g), as amended by the Statute, now makes clear that 
section 2-418 does not preclude "other rights," by indemnification or 
otherwise, to which a director or officer may be entitled. Of course, the 
"other rights" would be limited by public policy considerations. Public 
policy would, however, probably be interpreted at least as broadly as the 
indemnification now permitted by section 2-418(b) and possibly as 
broadly as the limitation of liability now authorized by section 2-
405.2(a). The phrase "those seeking indemnification" appearing in sec-
tion 145(f) of the Delaware statute has been replaced with the words "a 
director" in order to clarify that a person need not seek indemnification 
in order to have the benefit of the new non-exclusivity provision of sec-
tion 2-418(g). 
6. Alternative Sources of Reimbursement 
Finally, the Statute expands section 2-418(k) to specifically author-
ize a corporation to provide sources of reimbursement other than con-
ventional insurance, including a trust fund, letter of credit, surety bond 
or insurance issued by a captive subsidiary. This provision was not con-
tained in the 1987 Bill. 
IV. PROSPECTS 
The result of the Van Gorkom case, in Maryland as elsewhere, has 
been that the deliberative processes of many boards of directors have 
been strengthened through more information for the directors and better 
documentation of board actions. 56 This development is-entirely consis-
56. For some helpful suggestions in this regard, see Manning, Reflections and Practical 
Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1, 5 (1985). 
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tent with the recognition that the duty of directors should not be mea-
sured by the results of their decisions but by the process by which their 
decisions are made.57 As one court has recognized, "after-the-fact litiga-
tion is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions. 
The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily recon-
structed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call 
for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information."58 
The immediate benefit of the Statute has been to encourage competent, 
qualified, experienced men and women to continue to serve as directors 
of Maryland corporations. Enactment of the Statute surely also kept 
many Maryland corporations from reincorporating elsewhere. 
Directors are not likely to act much differently after the adoption of 
a liability-limitation charter provision under new section 2-405.2 than 
they acted before the statute. They are unlikely to view liability limita-
tion as a carte blanche for self-dealing, inattention or other mischief sim-
ply because they are now less exposed to suits for money damages by the 
corporation or stockholders. They know that they can still be sued by 
third parties or for equitable relief. Most directors, like most men and 
women, do not enjoy the litigation process even when their own assets 
are not at risk. 
V. CLOSING 
The General Assembly, by enacting the Statute, has reaffirmed the 
broad right of stockholders to decide for themselves the allocation of the 
economic risk of directors' or officers' misconduct. Indeed, Maryland 
corporations moved quickly to take advantage of the liability-limitation 
provisions of the Statute. Because the legislation was signed by the gov-
ernor on February 18, 1988, many calendar year corporations were able 
to include liability limitation proposals in the proxy statements for their 
annual meetings of stockholders in 1988.59 In all cases, the stockholders 
57. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982); see also A. BERLE & G. MEANS, 
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 203 (1968) ("After the 
fact, where the result has been catastrophic, juries are more likely to err on the side 
of the severe than on the lenient side in dealing with the director attacked.") (Foot-
note omitted). 
58. See Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and 
the Business Judgment Rule, A Commentary, 41 Bus. LAw. 1237, 1239 (1986); see 
also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 8.30 Official Comment (1984): sec-
tion 8.30 "sets forth the standard by focusing on the manner in which the director 
performs his duties, not the correctness of his decisions." 
59. Among the Maryland-chartered publicly-owned corporations whose stockholders 
have approved liability-limitation charter amendments are Alex. Brown Inc., Alex-
ander & Alexander Services Inc., The Black & Decker Corp., Crown Central Petro-
leum Corp., Equitable Bancorp., First Maryland Bancorp., Legg Mason, Inc., 
McCormick & Company, Inc., McDonnell Douglas Corp., NCR Corp., Martin 
Marietta Corporation, PHH Corp., T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. and USF&G 
Corp. 
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approved the limitation of liability of both directors and officers to the 
fullest extent permitted by the Statute. 
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APPENDIX 
MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
SECTION OF CORPORATIONS, BANKING AND 
BUSINESS LAW 
Committee on Corporate Laws 
Subcommittee on Director Liability 
Report 
[Vol. 18 
The undersigned Subcommittee was appointed in June, 1986, to 
consider the crisis in directors' and officers' liability insurance and re-
lated legislative activity in other states with a view to recommending leg-
islation for consideration by the General Assembly of Maryland. 
Following extensive research and numerous meetings during the summer 
and early fall of 1986, the Subcommittee issued a Report unanimously 
recommending the introduction and passage of legislation which would 
(a) clearly define the standard required to impose money damages against 
directors of Maryland corporations and (b) modify the current Maryland 
indemnification provisions to eliminate unwarranted restrictions and pro-
cedural complexities. See Maryland State Bar Association, Section on 
Corporations, Banking and Business Law, Committee on Corporate 
Laws, Subcommittee on Director Liability, Report (Nov. 5, 1986). The 
proposed bill's provision concerning the standard required to impose 
money damages against directors of Maryland corporations was com-
pletely self-executing, i.e., it applied directly to all Maryland corpora-
tions without the necessity of stockholder approval. 
The proposed bill was introduced in 1987 in the Senate of Maryland 
as S.B. 223 and in the House of Delegates as H.B. 242. Both bills were 
strongly supported by Governor Schaefer and his Administration. S.B. 
223 was approved, with amendments, by the Judicial Proceedings Com-
mittee in the Senate and was passed by the Senate and sent to the House 
of Delegates, where it was referred to the Judiciary Committee, which 
rejected both H.B. 242 and S.B. 223. There were indications by members 
of the Committee that they were concerned about the facts that (1) both 
bills would have limited the liability of director in suits by third parties as 
well as in suits by the corporation or by its stockholders and (2) no provi-
sion was made for approval by the stockholders of limitation of liability 
of the directors. 
Following the conclusion of the 1987 session of the General Assem-
bly, the Chairman and certain members of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, some of whom had opposed the 1987 bills, indicated that they would 
support revised legislation on the subject. T_he Committee held a hearing 
on June 2, to consider new legislation. Representatives of the Schaefer 
Administration, the business community and this Subcommittee testified 
in support of legislation addressing the issue. 
Following the hearing, the Subcommittee submitted a revised bill, 
drawing on statutes enacted in Delaware and other states, which would 
permit, but not require, stockholders to limit the liability of both direc-
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tors and officers to the corporation or stockholders (but not to third par-
ties) for money damages for any act or omission except for (1) actual 
receipt of an improper benefit in money, property or services and (2) 
active and deliberate dishonesty that was material to an adjudicated 
cause of action. 
The subject of this legislation was discussed by the House Judiciary 
Committee at a retreat at Deep Creek Lake on September 30 and Octo-
ber 1. The Committee further considered the proposed legislation at a 
work session in Annapolis on October 13. Representatives of the State 
Insurance Commissioner, the business community and this Subcommit-
tee testified in support of legislation permitting stockholders to limit the 
liability of both directors and officers of Maryland corporations. In addi-
tion, Kenneth C. Lundeen, a former Chairman of the Section, who was 
invited by a member of the Judiciary Committee to present his views as 
an independent observer, testified in support of the legislation, including 
the addition of officers. 
A copy of the bill proposed by the Subcommittee is attached hereto 
as [Addendum I]. Relevant portions of the bill are quoted as discussed in 
this Report. 
The Subcommittee continues to believe strongly that such legislation 
is of great importance for the State of Maryland. The Subcommittee also 
believes that the legislation is consistent with sound public policy as ex-
pressed in decisions of the appellate courts of Maryland, in recent legisla-
tive activity in more than 30 other states and in current commentary. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In the past two years, the cost of obtaining liability insurance for 
directors and officers of corporations throughout the nation has escalated 
dramatically. 1 According to the Wall Street Journal (March 21, 1986), 
premiums for D&O insurance increased over 360% in one year. Simul-
taneously, coverage has been reduced through decreased limits, increased 
deductibles, narrowed insuring clauses and expanded exclusions. Thus, 
the cost of D&O insurance relative to the amount of coverage has soared. 
For many companies, the cost of this insurance is simply not affordable 
and, indeed, some companies have not been able to obtain quotes at any 
price. "Crisis" is not too strong a word to describe the current situation 
and has been employed frequently in this context.. 
This . crisis originated, at least in part, in the general trend toward 
higher premiums in liability insurance throughout the country - a trend 
which may be attributed to many factors beyond the scope of thi~ Report 
1. Insurance against liability of directors and officers of corporations, commonly called 
"Directors and Officers Liability Insurance" or "D&O Insurance", is, in fact, two 
types of insurance: (1) insurance which covers the directors and officers directly for 
any losses incurred by them as directors and officers and (2) insurance which covers 
the company against any amounts which it may pay to directors and officers pursu-
ant to its indemnification obligation. 
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and which contributed to the passage of Senate Bill 600 (limiting the 
liability, in certain situations, of directors of charitable organizations) in 
the 1986 session of the General Assembly. More specifically, however, 
the current trend in the cost of D&O insurance has probably been influ-
enced by the growing number of lawsuits against directors and officers, 
resulting in increased defense costs, settlements and even judgments. 
Two areas, in particular, have given rise to an unusually large 
number of suits against directors and officers: takeovers and troubled 
companies. 
Directors are particularly likely to be sued in connection with merg-
ers and takeovers, whether or not "friendly." Because of the high stakes 
and the pressures on the board to act quickly, directors face risks of lia-
bility almost regardless of whether they vote for or against a takeover. 
One notable example is the well-known case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), in which the Supreme Court of Delaware held 
that the directors of Trans Union Corporation could be held liable for 
damages approaching $50,000,000 in approving a negotiated merger 
without sufficient information and deliberation even though the price was 
nearly 50% higher than the recent market price for Trans Union's stock 
and even though the investment bankers had been unsuccessful in trying 
to obtain a still higher price. 
Financially-troubled companies are another frequent source of liti-
gation against directors and officers. In 1984, for example, insurers paid 
approximately $25,000,000 - believed to be the largest D&O insurance 
payment in history - to settle stockholder suits alleging mismanagement 
by former directors and officers of The Wickes Companies. 
In Fox v. Chase Manhattan Corporation, No. 8192-85 (Del. Ch. Dec. 
6, 1985) (LEXIS, DEL library, Cases file), the Delaware Chancery Court 
approved a settlement of $32,500,000 in a suit against Chase Manhattan 
Corporation and six of its officers arising out of the collapse of Drysdale 
Government Securities, Inc. A few months later, Seafirst Corp., a bank 
holding company headquartered in Seattle, and five of its officers agreed 
to entry of a judgment against the officers for $110,000,000. American 
Banker (July 9, 1986), p. 3. The company agreed to limit its recovery to 
the proceeds of the insurance policies covering the officers. 
Even doing nothing can be the basis for liability. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held recently that a director who 
acquiesces in a breach of fiduciary duty by another director may be held 
jointly and severally liable for the breach. Thorn v. Reliance Van Com-
pany, Inc., 782 F.2d 1031 (1985) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, USAPP file). 
Unfortunately, as the Court in Van Gorkom noted: "It is, of course, 
a fact of corporate life that today when faced with difficult or sensitive 
issues, directors often are subject to suit, irrespective of the decisions they 
make." /d. at 881. Moreover, as another court has recognized, "after-
the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate business deci-
sions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily 
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reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often 
call for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect informa-
tion." Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982). 
As a result of these and other cases, some of the few remaining pri-
mary D&O insurance carriers began to exclude all activities in the con-
text of hostile takeovers from coverage in new or reissued D&O policies. 
Almost immediately, outside directors of many major publicly-held cor-
porations began to resign rather than continue to serve without insur-
ance. The New York Times (March 7, 1986). Most of the resigned 
directors have been outsiders. If this trend continues, many publicly-
held corporations will be left with only inside directors - a reversal of 
the position which the Securities and Exchange Commission, the New 
York Stock Exchange and various commentators have tried to en-
courage. Corporations will lose a vital source of independent thought 
and expertise and the remaining directors will inevitably tend toward 
caution and conservatism rather than innovation and the taking of sound 
business risks. 
Older executives, in particular, with the greatest experience and the 
greatest wealth, are unlikely to be willing to risk exposing their personal 
assets to the increased hazards of serving as a director. Obviously a 
trend which results in reducing the number of qualified outside directors 
is poor public policy. 
II. ACTION IN OTHER STATES 
Already, several other states have responded legislatively to this pre-
dicament. In general, these states have followed one or more of four 
approaches: 
1. Charter Amendment. In June, 1986, the General Corporation 
Law of Delaware (the "Delaware Code") was amended to permit Dela-
ware corporations by charter provision to reduce the liability of directors 
for their acts or omissions. The heart of the new legislation, which be-
came effective on July 1, 1986, is a provision amending Section 102(b) of 
the Delaware Code to permit, with certain exceptions, a Delaware corpo-
ration to include in its certificate of incorporation, either as originally 
filed or by an amendment approved by its stockholders, a provision 
"eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to a corpora-
tion or its stockholders for money damages for breach of fiduciary duty 
as a director .... " The statute specifically excepts breaches of the duty of 
loyalty, acts not in good faith, intentional misconduct and improper ben-
efit. Several other provisions of the bill amended various subsections of 
Section 145 of the Delaware Code dealing with indemnification of direc-
tors and officers. Unfortunately, there are questions surrounding the new 
law, principally its exceptions which may restrict its efficacy in solving 
the problems it purports to address. 
Charter option, or enabling, statutes have been adopted by 24 other 
. states. The principal difference among the charter option statutes is 
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found in their exceptions. Eleven states (Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Da-
kota and Wyoming) have copied all six of the Delaware exceptions. The 
other states (Arkansas, California, Georgia, Montana, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah and Washington) have modified these exceptions in whole or in 
part. 
2. Expanded Indemnifiability. At least nine states- Florida, Indi-
ana, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania and Wisconsin - have enacted statutes expanding the right of 
corporations to indemnify their directors for expenses, settlements and 
adverse judgments in derivative suits. The typical indemnification stat-
ute, as applied to derivative suits, permits the director or officer to be 
indemnified only against expenses in the case of a successful defense or a 
settlement and permits no indemnification, even for expenses, in the case 
of an adverse judgment (unless ordered by a court). Some states permit 
indemnification for amounts paid in settlement of derivative actions 
while others do not permit such indemnification. 
The most far-reaching statutory developments affecting derivative 
suits are provisions adopted in four states- Wisconsin, Indiana, North 
Carolina and Virginia - eliminating or substantially eliminating the dis-
tinction between third-party and derivative suits and permitting indemni-
fication against judgments, settlements and expenses for any director or 
officer who meets the general statutory standards for indemnification. 
Five other states - Florida, Michigan, Missouri, New York and 
Nevada - now permit indemnification against expenses (except in the 
case of liability) and settlements. 
3. Money Limit on Liability. Virginia, our most vigorous competitor 
for business development, has enacted a statute limiting the damages 
which may be "assessed against an officer or director" in a suit by or in 
the right of the corporation or by the stockholders directly to the lesser 
of (1) the amount specified in the charter (or, if approved by the stock- . 
holders, in the bylaws) or (2) the greater of (a) $100,000 or (b) "the 
amount of cash compensation received by the officer or director from the 
corporation during the twelve months immediately preceding the act or 
omission for which liability was imposed." 1987 Va. Acts Ch. 257, 
amending VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(A) (Supp. 1987). Thus, if the 
shareholders take no action to amend the charter or bylaws, the liability 
of a director or officer of a Virginia corporation will be limited to the 
greater of $100,000 or his cash compensation over the year preceding the 
contested act or omission. The stockholders, however, may reduce (but 
not increase) by amendment to the charter or bylaws the $100,000/12-
month cash compensation limit. Indeed the stockholders may eliminate 
monetary liability altogether. 
The statute does not apply to "willful misconduct or knowing viola-
tion of the criminal law or of any federal or state securities law .... " 
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4. Increased Standard of Liability For Money Damages. Four states 
-Indiana, Florida, Ohio and Wisconsin- have enacted statutes which 
directly alter, without any requirement for stockholder approval, the 
standard of liability for imposition of money damages against directors. 
Under the new Indiana statute, a director is liable only if he has breached 
or failed to perform his duties in compliance with the statutory standard 
of care and "the breach or failure to perform constitutes willful miscon-
duct or recklessness." IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Burns Supp. 
1987). The Florida, Ohio and Wisconsin statutes have similar exceptions 
for egregious misconduct. As noted above, the 1987 bills which were 
rejected by the General Assembly followed this approach. 
III. PROPOSALS FOR MARYLAND 
The Subcommittee has considered all of the foregoing approaches in 
conjunction with its review of the applicable provisions of the Maryland 
General Corporation Law ("MGCL"). The Subcommittee believes that 
if Maryland does not act (a) directors of many Maryland corporations 
will refuse to continue to serve as directors, thus depriving these corpora-
tions and their stockholders of some of the most experienced and quali-
fied directors, and/or (b) Maryland will face the loss of many Maryland-
chartered corporations to other states with more favorable legislation. 
Indeed, several Maryland corporations (e.g. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 
Luskin's, Inc., Penta Systems International, Inc. and PUBCO Corpora-
tion) have already reincorporated to other states. 
With respect to the principal problem of the standard of conduct for 
directors, the Subcommittee has concluded that the charter option ap-
proach (i.e., permitting the stockholders to limit the liability of directors 
and officer for money damages in suits by the corporation or its stock-
holders) is preferred. Even the stockholders, however, would not be per-
mitted to limit the liability of directors or officers for actual receipt of an 
improper personal benefit in money, property or services or for active 
and deliberate dishonesty that was material to an adjudicated cause of 
action. 
The principal Maryland cases on director liability, Parish v. Mary-
land & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 74, 242 A.2d 512, 540 
(1968), and Mountain Manor Realty v. Buccheri, 55 Md. App. 185, 194, 
461 A.2d 45, 51 ( 1983), already establish a standard of "gross and culpa-
ble negligence" as a prerequisite to money liability for directors. 2 This 
judicial standard would continue to apply to corporations, the stockhold-
ers of which do not take advantage of the new legislation by approving a 
charter amendment limiting the liability of their directors or officers. If, 
and only if the stockholders approved, a Maryland corporation could 
2. Inexplicably, the Court of Appeals has referred both to "gross and culpable" negli-
gence and "gross or culpable" negligence. Parish, supra, 250 Md. at 74-76, 242 
A.2d at 540-41 (1968). See also, Parish v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers 
Ass'n, 261 Md. 618, 681, 277 A.2d 19, 48, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). 
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limit the liability of its directors and officers for all acts or omissions 
except, as noted above, for improper personal benefits and active and 
deliberate dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that the stock-
holders, if they so desire, could limit the liability of their directors and 
officers to some lesser standard, e.g., gross negligence. 
In particular, the Subcommittee believes that this new standard 
would have no impact upon truly venal or egregious conduct by self-
dealing directors and officers of Maryland corporations. Finally, nothing 
in this proposal would in any way affect the right of stockholders under 
Section 2-406 to remove directors "with or without cause .... " 
The Subcommittee's proposals are discussed in detail below: 
1. Charter Option 
The Subcommittee proposes that a new paragraph (8) be added to 
Section 2-104(b) of the MGCL, that subsection (c) of Section 2-405.1 of 
the MGCL be amended and that a new section(§ 2-405.2) be enacted, as 
follows: 
(b) The articles of incorporation may include: 
(1) Any provision not inconsistent with law which defines, 
limits, or regulates the powers of the corporation, its directors 
and stockholders, any class of its stockholders, or the holders of 
any bonds, notes or other securities which it may issue; 
(2) Any restriction not inconsistent with law on the trans-
ferability of stock of any class; 
(3) Any provision authorized by this article to be included 
in the bylaws; 
(4) Any provision which requires for any purpose the con-
currence of a greater proportion of the votes of all classes or of 
any class of stock than the proportion required by this article 
for that purpose; 
(5) A provision which requires for any purpose a lesser 
proportion of the votes of all classes or of any class of stock 
than the proportion required by this article for that purpose, 
but this proportion may not be less than a majority of all the 
votes entitled to be cast on the matter; 
(6) A provision which divides its directors into classes and 
specifies the term of office of each class; [and] 
(7) A provision for minority representation through cumu-
lative voting in the election of directors and the terms on which 
cumulative voting rights may be exercised[.]; AND 
(8) A PROVISION WHICH VARIES IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH § 2-405.2(A) OF TH.IS TITLE THE STAN-
DARDS FOR LIABILITY OF THE DIRECTORS AND 
OFFICERS OF A CORPORATION FOR MONEY 
DAMAGES. 
2-405.1 
(c) A person who performs his duties in accordance with 
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the standard provided in this section has no liability by reason 
of being or having been a director of a corporation [, unless, in 
a situation to which § 2-419(d) of this subtitle applies, a con-
tract or transaction is determined not to have been fair and rea-
sonable to the corporation]. 
2-405.2 
(A) THE CHARTER OF THE CORPORATION MAY 
INCLUDE ANY PROVISION EXPANDING OR LIMIT-
ING THE LIABILITY OF ITS DIRECTORS AND OF-
FICERS TO THE CORPORATION OR ITS 
STOCKHOLDERS FOR MONEY DAMAGES BUT MAY 
NOT INCLUDE ANY PROVISION WHICH RESTRICTS 
OR LIMITS THE LIABILITY OF ITS DIRECTORS OR 
OFFICERS TO THE CORPORATION OR ITS 
STOCKHOLDERS: 
(1) TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS PROVED THAT 
THE PERSON ACTUALLY RECEIVED AN IMPROPER 
BENEFIT IN MONEY, PROPERTY, OR SERVICES, FOR 
THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFIT IN MONEY, PROP-
ERTY, OR SERVICES ACTUALLY RECEIVED; 
(2) TO THE EXTENT THAT A JUDGMENT OR 
OTHER FINAL ADJUDICATION ADVERSE TO THE 
PERSON IS ENTERED IN A PROCEEDING BASED ON 
A FINDING IN THE PROCEEDING THAT THE PER-
SON'S ACTION, OR FAILURE TO ACT, WAS THERE-
SULT OF ACTIVE AND DELIBERATE DISHONESTY 
AND WAS MATERIAL TO THE CAUSE OF ACTION 
ADJUDICATED IN THE PROCEEDING; OR 
(3) WITH RESPECT TO ANY ACTION DESCRIBED 
IN SUBSECTION (B) OF THIS SECTION. 
(B) THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO AN AC-
TION BROUGHT BY OR ON BEHALF OF A STATE 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY, RECEIVER, CONSERVA-
TOR, OR DEPOSITOR AGAINST A DIRECTOR OR OF-
FICER OF: 
(1) A BANKING INSTITUTION AS DEFINED IN 
§ 1-101 OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARTICLE; 
(2) A CREDIT UNION .... ; 
(3) A SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION .. :.: 
(4) A SUBSIDIARY OF A BANKING INSTITUTION, 
CREDIT UNION, OR SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIA-
TION DESCRIBED IN THIS SUBSECTION. 
(C) THIS SECTION MAY NOT BE CONSTRUED TO 
AFFECT THE LIABILITY OF A PERSON IN ANY CA-
PACITY OTHER THAN THE PERSON'S CAPACITY AS 
A DIRECTOR OR OFFICER. 
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The revisions recommended by the Subcommittee reflect the conclu-
262 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
sion that, with respect to the principal issue of directors' and officers' 
liability discussed above, the preferred approach is to permit the stock-
holders to decide for themselves the standard required to impose per-
sonal liability for money damages in suits by the corporation or by its 
stockholders. 
Section 2-405.1(a) of the MGCL provides that a director of a Mary-
land corporation must perform his duties in "good faith", "[i]n a manner 
he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation" and 
"[w]ith the care [of] an ordinarily prudent person in a like position ... 
under' similar circumstances." (This standard of care, which was 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1976, follows the standard of care 
set forth in Section 8.30 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act 
and has been adopted by Indiana, Virginia and several other states.) In 
performing these duties, the director is permitted to rely upon legal opin-
ions, financial statements and other reports or information prepared by 
officers or employees of the corporation or by outside experts as long as 
the director has no "knowledge concerning the matter in question which 
would cause such reliance to be unwarranted." MGCL, § 2-405.1(b). 
Under current law, if a director performs his duties in accordance 
with the tripartite standard of Section 2-405.1 (a), he will have "no liabil-
ity by reason of being or having been a director of a corporation, unless, 
in a situation to which§ 2-419(d) ... applies, a contract or transaction is 
determined not to have been fair and reasonable to the corporation." Id., 
§ 2-405.1(c). 
The Subcommittee recommends that the stockholders be permitted 
to provide, by charter, that directors and officers will not be liable for 
money damages in suit by the corporation or the stockholders unless an 
act or omission constitutes actual receipt of an improper benefit or active 
and deliberate dishonesty. The purpose of setting out the revised liability 
standard as a new section is to eliminate any argument that, by its inclu-
sion in Section 2-405.1, the statutory limitation on liability is intended to 
apply only to a director's breach of the standard of care set forth in Sec-
tion 2-405.1(a) and not to a breach of the duty of loyalty. 
The proposed Section 2-405.2(a) addresses the liability of directors 
and officers for damages only. That is consistent with existing Section 2-
405.1(c). The protection sought to be provided is intended to limit the 
availability of directors' and officers' personal assets as a source for re-
covery by the corporation or stockholders. It is not intended to affect in 
any way the availability of equitable remedies, such as an injunction or 
rescission, for a director's violation of his duties or the right of the stock-
holders to remove a director at any time with or without cause. 
The Subcommittee believes that permitting stockholders to decide 
whether to limit the liability of directors and officers for money damages 
is desirable for several reasons: First, and most importantly, it allows the 
owners of the corporation - the stockholders - to decide the issue for 
themselves. Second, it follows similar legislative precedents already es-
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tablished in Delaware and 24 other states and will enable Maryland 
courts to take advantage of subsequent cases decided in those states 
under this standard. Third, it will add greater clarity and certainty to the 
law than is available under judicial precedents. Fourth, it will add to the 
perception of Maryland as a state with a favorable and responsive climate 
to business. Fifth, it will discourage directors and officers of existing 
Maryland-chartered publicly-held corporations from recommending 
reincorporation in other states by reassuring the directors and officers 
that they will not be held personally liable for money damages for simple 
negligence. Sixth, newly-established businesses are more likely to incor-
porate in Maryland to the extent that it is perceived as having an up-to-
date corporation statute. Finally, enactment of this proposed legislation 
will encourage directors of existing Maryland-chartered corporations to 
continue to serve s directors. 
Failure to enact such legislation is likely to result in (a) the 
reincorporation of many Maryland corporations in other states, thus in-
juring the state's efforts to be perceived as a favorable business climate, 
and/or (b) the resignation of directors of Maryland corporations, thus 
depriving the stockholders of these corporations (many of whom are 
Maryland residents) of some of the most qualified individuals to super-
vise the managements of these corporations. 
Accordingly, the Subcommittee proposes adding a new paragraph 
(8) to Section 2-104(b) of the MGCL permitting a charter provision vary-
ing the standard for liability for money damages but only to the extent 
permitted in subsection (a) of new Section 2-405.2. New Section 2-
405.2(a) explicitly authorizes eliminating or limiting the liability of direc-
tors for money damages except that the charter may not restrict or limit 
liability if (1) a director has actually received an improper personal bene-
fit in money, property or services or (2) an adverse judgment establishes 
that a director's acts or omissions resulted from active and deliberate 
dishonesty and were material to the cause of action. 
An exception for improper personal benefit appears in many, 
although not all, of the 25 charter option statutes. The Subcommittee 
proposes limiting it in the Maryland bill to benefits actually received in 
the form of money, property or services in order to eliminate any argu-
ment that such ambiguous items as business goodwill or social ingratia-
tion may constitute a benefit to a director or officer. The exception for 
"active and deliberate dishonesty" is based upon a similar exclusion ap-
pearing in virtually every directors and officers liability insurance policy 
and also upon the language of a New York statute enacted last year. 
Subsection (a)(3) specifically prohibits the stockholders from limit-
ing the liability of directors or officers with respect to any action brought 
by or on behalf of a state governmental entity, receiver, conservator or 
depositor against a director or officer of a banking institution, a credit 
union, a savings and loan association or a subsidiary of any such entity. 
Directors occupy a unique place in the governance of American cor-
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porations. Often, particularly among larger corporations with the most 
stockholders, they are outsiders with little or no equity investment of 
their own in the corporation; yet they are charged with protecting the 
investments of thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands, of stock-
holders, in Maryland and elsewhere. Their compensation is insignificant 
relative to the magnitude of their risks and responsibilities. Generally, it 
is a part-time position. Indeed, some of the individuals most sought as 
corporate directors are senior executive officers of other corporations 
who can bring a wide range of experience and knowledge to the 
corporation. 
The Subcommittee believes that inclusion of officers in the proposed 
legislation is particularly important: 
First, many of the decisions and transactions which are submitted to 
a Board of Directors originate among the officers and, if approved by the 
Board, are referred to the officers for implementation. They are entitled, 
if the stockholders so decide, to be protected to the same degree as 
officers. 
Second, unlike the 1987 bills, the proposed 1988 bill permits the 
stockholders to decide the issue of limitation of liability. Under the pro-
posed bill, the stockholders would be able to limit the liability of direc-
tors alone, officers alone, both or neither. 
Third, the 1987 bills did not limit the liability of directors to suits by 
the corporation or its stockholders. The proposed 1988 bill is expressly 
limited solely to suits by the corporation or its stockholders. It would not 
include suits by third parties. Thus, the only claimants whose rights 
would be affected by a limitation on the liability of directors and officers 
would be the stockholders, and then only with their approval. 
Fourth, there is no logical policy reason for permitting stockholders 
to limit the liability of directors but not permitting them to limit the 
liability of officers. Moreover, treating directors and officers alike for 
purposes of permitting their liability to be limited is consistent with the 
identical treatment of directors and officers under the indemnification 
provisions of Section 2-418 of the MGCL. It would be inconsistent for 
directors and officers to be working together on evaluating, negotiating 
or implementing a major corporate transaction for which the directors' 
liability could be limited and the officers' liability could not. 
Fifth, directors and officers liability insurers are more likely to re-
duce their premiums if they are assured that the liability of both directors 
and officers has been limited. Since most D&O insurance policies cover 
both directors and officers, the liability of an officer could result in a 
claim against the insurance company even though the directors' liability 
had been limited. 
Sixth, the recently-enacted Virginia statute, discussed above, applies 
to both directors and officers. One Baltimore-based Maryland-chartered 
corporation has already reincorporated in Virginia, another has indicated 
in a proxy statement that it may reincorporate there and other corpora-
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tions incorporated in other states have also reincorporated in Virginia. 
Other states, e.g., New Jersey, have also enacted legislation authorizing 
limits on the liability of officers as well as directors. 
Finally, permitting stockholders to decide whether to decide 
whether to limit the liability of both officers and directors enhances the 
role of the stockholders incorporate governance. The stockholders are 
already charged with the duty of voting on mergers, charter amend-
ments, election of directors and other significant corporate acts. Permit-
ting the stockholders to decide for themselves whether to limit the 
liability of officers in addition to directors is not only consistent and 
sound public policy, as indicated above, but broadens the right of the 
stockholders to determine for themselves the best interest for the corpo-
rations they own. 
Section 2-405.1(c) is amended by eliminating the reference to Sec-
tion 2-419. Section 2-419 provides alternative means of insulating from 
voidness or voidability transactions between a corporation and a director; 
it does not provide for personal liability for directors. Accordingly, the 
reference to Section 2-419 in Section 2-405.1 (c) is inappropriate and 
should be deleted. Section 8.30(d) of the Model Act- the counterpart 
to Section 2-405.1(c) -contains no similar reference to the counterpart 
of Section 2-419. 
2. Change in Standards for Indemnification 
Section 2-418(b)(1) currently sets forth the "good faith", "reason-
able belief" standards which a director or officer3 must satisfy in order to 
be entitled to indemnification. The Subcommittee recommends amend-
ing Section 2-418(b)(1) to permit a corporation to indemnify a director 
unless it is proved that the individual (1) acted in bad faith or with active 
and deliberate dishonesty, (2) actually received an improper personal 
benefit in money, property or services or (3) in the case of a criminal 
proceeding had reasonable cause to believe that his act or omission was 
unlawful: 
(b)(1) A corporation may indemnify any director made a 
party to any proceeding by reason of service in that capacity [if 
the director: 
(i) Acted in good faith; 
(ii) Reasonably believed: 
1. In the case of conduct in the director's official capacity 
with the corporation, that the conduct was in the best interests 
of the corporation; and 
2. In all other cases, that the conduct was at least not op-
posed to the best interests of the corporation; and] 
UNLESS IT IS PROVED THAT: 
3. As noted above, Section 2-418(j)(l) provides that, unless the charter provides other-
wise, an officer "shall be indemnified as and to the extent provided . . . for a 
director .... " 
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(I) THE ACT OR OMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR 
WAS MATERIAL TO THE CAUSE OF ACTION ADJUDI-
CATED IN THE PROCEEDING: AND 
1. WAS COMMITTED IN BAD FAITH; OR 
2. WAS THE RESULT OF ACTIVE AND DELIBER-
ATE DISHONESTY; OR 
(II) THE DIRECTOR ACTUALLY RECEIVED AN 
IMPROPER PERSONAL BENEFIT IN MONEY, PROP-
ERTY, OR SERVICES; OR 
(III) In the case of any criminal proceeding, THE DIREC-
TOR HAD [no] reasonable cause to believe that the [conduct] 
ACT OR OMISSION was unlawful. 
Expanding the right of the corporation to indemnify its directors 
and officers is consistent with statutory amendments enacted by numer-
ous other states. It should be noted that, as in the case of limitation of 
liability, the proposed bill would merely permit, not require, the corpora-
tion to act. 
3. Expansion of Indemnification in Derivative Suits 
Section 2-418(b)(2)(ii) currently provides that, in a derivative suit, 
indemnification may only be made against reasonable expenses and may 
not be made, even for expenses, if the individual has been adjudged to be 
liable to the corporation. The Subcommittee recommends deleting the 
limitation of indemnification in derivative suits to reasonable expenses in 
order to permit a director to be indemnified for settlements of derivative 
suits: 
(2)(i) Indemnification may be against judgments, penalties, 
fines, settlements; and reasonable expenses actually incurred by 
the director in connection with the proceeding. 
(ii) However, if the proceeding was one by or in the right 
of the corporation, indemnification [may be made only against 
reasonable expenses and] may not be made in respect of any 
proceeding in which the director shall have been adjudged to be 
liable to the corporation. 
This change will encourage settlements by permitting indemnification for 
amounts paid in settlement and not just for expenses. In addition, as 
noted below, as a result of the expansion of the language of Section 2-
418(g), relating to non-exclusivity, it is no longer necessary to limit in-
demnification in derivative suits to reasonable expenses. 
4. Changes in Indemnification Procedures 
The Subcommittee recommends the following four amendments to 
Section 2-418 of the MGCL relating to the procedures for 
indemnification: 
Presumption of Non-Compliance (Section 2-418(b)(3)) 
(b)(3) (I) The termination of any proceeding by judgment, order, 
OR settlement [, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its 
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equivalent creates a rebuttable] DOES NOT CREATE A presumption 
that the director did not meet the requisite standard of conduct set forth 
in this subsection. 
(II) THE TERMINATION OF ANY PROCEEDING BY CON-
VICTION ON A PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE OR ITS 
EQUIVALENT CREATES A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION 
THAT THE DIRECTOR DID NOT MEET THAT STANDARD OF 
CONDUCT. 
Section 2-418(b)(3) currently provides that termination of any pro-
ceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction or a nolo contendere 
plea creates a rebuttable presumption that the director did not meet the 
requisite standard of conduct set forth in Section 2-418(b)(l). The Sub-
committee recommends that, as to convictions and nolo contendere pleas, 
a rebuttable presumption should continue but that, as to judgments, or-
ders and settlements, there should be no presumption one way or the 
other. 
Read literally, the termination of a proceeding by a judgment of no 
liability presently creates a rebuttable presumption that the director did 
not meet the requisite standard of conduct. While the Subcommittee be-
lieves that such a result would be overridden by the requirement of in-
demnification in subsection (d)(l), it is at least superficially inconsistent 
with that subsection. 
The problem with Section 2-418(b)(3) as it currently reads is most 
acute in the case of settlements. A settlement may be the result of many 
factors other than an assessment of the likelihood of liability. For exam-
ple, a suit may be settled for its .. nuisance" value at an amount less than 
the cost to the corporation of litigating to a successful conclusion. It is 
difficult to imagine, therefore, why a settlement should create a presump-
tion of non-compliance with the standards of Section 2-418(b)(l). 
As a matter of public policy, settlements are to be encouraged as a 
means of terminating litigation, and it is against public policy to discour-
age settlements by providing that corporate officers and directors may 
lose their indemnification unless they pursue all litigation to its ultimate 
conclusion. 
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act (Section 8.51(c)) and 
the new Virginia Stock Corporation Act (Section 13.1-697(C)) both spe-
cifically provide that a judgment, settlement or other termination of the 
proceeding does not create a presumption that the director did not meet 
the requisite standard of care. Likewise, Section 145(a) of the Delaware 
statute provides: 
The termination of any action, suit or proceeding by judgment, 
order, settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere 
or its equivalent, shall not, of itself, create a presumption that 
the person did not act in good faith and in a manner which he 
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests 
of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal action or 
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proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe that his conduct 
was unlawful. 
(Emphasis added.) The statutes of 41 other states are similar. Maryland 
is the only state in which a settlement creates a presumption that the 
director did not meet the requisite standard of care. Members of the 
Subcommittee are personally aware of many situations in which counsel 
to Maryland-chartered corporations (including counsel located in other 
states) have expressed surprise and apprehension about the presumption 
of non-compliance in Section 2-418(b )(1 ). 
The revisions recommended by the Subcommittee are based largely 
upon Section 145(a) of the Delaware statute. However, the phrase "of 
itself" appearing in the Delaware statute (as well as in the Model Act 
and most other state statutes) has been deleted because it was felt that 
this phrase suggested the possibility that the termination of the proceed-
ing could be combined with some other fact to create a presumption. 
The Subcommittee believes that all of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the termination should be available as evidence, subject to the 
usual evidentiary rules, but that no presumption should be created. 
Non-Exclusivity (Section 2-418(g)) 
(g) [A provision for the corporation to indemnify a direc-
tor who is made a party to a proceeding, whether contained in] 
THE INDEMNIFICATION AND ADVANCEMENT OF 
EXPENSES PROVIDED OR AUTHORIZED BY THIS 
SECTION MAY NOT BE DEEMED EXCLUSIVE OF ANY 
OTHER RIGHTS, BY INDEMNIFICATION OR OTHER-
WISE, TO WHICH A DIRECTOR MAY BE ENTITLED 
UNDER the charter, the bylaws, a resolution of stockholders 
or directors, an agreement or otherwise, [except as contem-
plated by subsection (k) of this section, is not valid unless con-
sistent with this section or, to the extent that indemnity under 
this section is limited by the charter, consistent with the char-
ter] BOTH AS TO ACTION IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY 
AND AS TO ACTION IN ANOTHER CAPACITY WHILE 
HOLDING SUCH OFFICE. 
Under current Section 2-418(g), any contract between a corporation 
and its directors providing for indemnification must be "consistent with" 
the indemnification permitted by Section 2-418. 
This provision is much more restrictive than the comparable provi-
sion in Delaware, Section 145(f), which provides that the indemnifica-
tion provided by state "shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights 
to which those seeking indemnification may be entitled under any bylaw, 
agreement, ... or otherwise .... " Thus, Maryland's Section 2-418(g) is 
a limitation upon indemnification while Delaware's Section 145(f) is a 
non-exclusive provision for indemnification. Approximately 30 other 
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states and the District of Columbia have non-exclusivity provisions sub-
stantially similar to Delaware's. 
Even the Delaware statute, however, could be read to limit any in-
demnification right to Section 145, although "other rights" would not be 
deemed to be excluded by Section 145. 
Current Section 2-418(g) is based upon Section 8.58(a) of the Re-
vised Model Act. The Official Comment to Section 8.58(a) notes that the 
non-exclusive statutory provisions, such as Delaware's, make "no at-
tempt to limit the nonstatutory creation of rights of indemnification. 
This kind of language is subject to misconstruction ... since nonstatu-
tory conceptions of public policy limit the power of the corporation to 
indemnify or to contract to indemnify directors .... " Significantly, how-
ever, the Official Comment also notes that the phrase 
"to the extent it is consistent with" is not synonymous with 
"exclusive." Situations may well develop from time to time in 
which indemnification is permissible under Section 8.58 but 
would be precluded if all portions of [the indemnification stat-
ute] were viewed as exclusive. 
Kentucky follows the 1980 version of the Model Act in its indemni-
fication provision, except for its non-exclusivity provision, which follows 
the Delaware statute. 
The purpose of the revisions to Section 2-418(g) is to make clear 
that any rights, by indemnification or otherwise, to which a director may 
be entitled are not precluded by Section 2-418. Of course, the "other 
rights" referred to in Section 2-418(g) would be limited by public policy 
considerations. 
The revisions recommended by the Subcommittee are based largely 
upon Section 145(f) of the Delaware statute. However, the phrase 
"those seeking indemnification" has been replaced with the words "a di-
rector" in order to clarify that a person need not seek indemnification in 
order to have the benefit of the non-exclusivity provision of new Section 
2-418(g). 
By virtue of Section 2-4180), the proposed non-exclusivity provision 
would also apply to officers, employees and agents as well as to directors. 
Determination of Permissibility of Indemnification (Section 2-
418(e)) 
(e) (1) Indemnification under subsection (b) of this section 
may not be made by the corporation unless authorized [in the 
specific case] FOR A SPECIFIC PROCEEDING after a deter-
mination has been made that indemnification of the director is 
permissible in the circumstances because the director has met 
the standard of conduct set forth in subsection (b) of this 
section. 
Section 2-418(e) currently provides that indemnification must be 
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"authorized in the specific case .... " The word "case" is nowhere de-
fined in Section 2-418 and its use, especially in view of the fact that the 
word "proceeding" is defined, frequently raises the question of whether 
indemnification for each bill for expenses in connection with a proceed-
ing must be separately authorized after each submission for expenses to 
be paid in advance under subsection (f). This interpretation could lead 
to repeated and unnecessary reexamination of the same issue and the 
same circumstances each time expenses are incurred, at excessive cost to 
the corporation. The substitution of the phrase "for a specific proceed-
ing" for the phrase "in the specific case" solves this problem. 
Advance Payment of Expenses (Section 2-418(/)) 
(f)(1) Reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a 
party to a proceeding may be paid or reimbursed by the corpo-
ration in advance of the final disposition of the proceeding [, 
after a determination that the facts then known to those mak-
ing the determination would not preclude ind~mnification 
under this section,] upon receipt by the corporation of: 
(i) A written affirmation by the director of the director's 
good faith belief that the standard of conduct necessary for in-
demnification by the corporation as authorized in this section 
has been met; and 
(ii) A written undertaking by or on behalf of the director 
to repay the amount if it shall ultimately be determined that the 
standard of conduct has not been met. 
(2) The undertaking required by subparagraph (ii) of para-
graph (1) of this subsection shall be an unlimited general obli-
gation of the director but need not be secured and may be 
accepted without reference to financial ability to make the 
repayment. 
(3) [Determinations and authorizations of payments] 
PAYMENTS under this subsection shall be [in the manner] 
MADE AS PROVIDED BY THE CHARTER, BYLAWS, 
OR CONTRACT OR AS specified in subsection (e) of this 
section. 
Section 2-418(f) currently requires, as a prerequisite to advance pay-
ment of expenses, a determination in e~ch case that indemnification 
would not be precluded under the facts known at the time of the determi-
nation. The proposed revisions would eliminate the necessity for this 
determination. 
Instead, a corporation could adopt a general provision for advance 
payment of expenses in its charter or bylaws or by contract. Alterna-
tively, a corporation could still advance expenses pursuant to a determi-
nation under Section 2-418(e) "that indemnification is permissible in the 
circumstances because the director has met the standard of conduct set 
forth in subsection (b) .... " In either case, advance payment of expenses 
could be made only upon receipt of (a) a written affirmation of the direc-
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tor's good faith belief that he met the standard of conduct for indemnifi-
cation and (b) a written undertaking to repay if it is ultimately 
determined that the standard of conduct was not met. 
The proposed revision follows closely the amendment recently en-
acted in Delaware. The amendment would allow Maryland corporations 
the same flexibility in administering these matters as Delaware 
corporations. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Subcommittee wishes to reemphasize its unanimous view that 
legislation in these areas is essential in order to provide a sound response 
by the State of Maryland to problems that have truly reached crisis pro-
portions. In addition, we believe that this legislation will contribute to a 
perception of Maryland as a state with a favorable and responsible cli-
mate for new and established businesses. This legislation, we believe, 
represents sound fundamental public policy and not merely a short-term 
reaction of undue alarm or an effort to prevent migration of Maryland 
corporations out of state at any cost. The basic elements of the proposed 
legislation have been reviewed and approved by the full Committee on 
Corporate Laws. Respectfully submitted, 
James J. Hanks, Jr., Chairman 
Arthur F. Fergenson 
Arthur W. Machen, Jr. 
Larry P. Scriggins 
J. W. Thompson Webb 
John J. Woloszyn 
Dated: November 16, 1987 
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ADDENDUM I 
WILLIAM DONALD SCHAEFER, Governor 
CHAPTER 3 
(House Bill 273) 
AN ACT concerning 
Corporations and Associations -
Standard of Liability and Indemnification 
[Vol. 18 
FOR the purpose of authorizing a corporate charter to alter the 
standard for imposing liability for damages on corporate directors 
and officers; providing for certain exceptions; modifying the pre-
sumptions applicable to, and the procedures for establishing the ba-
sis for, indemnification and advancement of expenses to corporate 
directors and certain other persons; providing for the application 
and construction of certain provisions of this Act; generally relating 
to the standards for liability for corporate directors and officers and 
indemnification of corporate directors and certain other persons; 
and making this Act an emergency measure. 
BY adding to 
Article - Corporations and Associations 
Section 2-405.2 
Annotated Code of Maryland 
(1985 Replacement Volume and 1987 Supplement) 
BY repealing and reenacting, with amendments, 
Article - Corporations and Associations 
Section 2-104(b), 2-405.1(c), and 2-418(b), (e)(1), (f), (g), and 
(k) 
Annotated Code of Maryland 
(1985 Replacement Volume and 1987 Supplement) 
SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEM-
BLY OF MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland read as follows: 
Article - Corporations and Associations 
2-104. 
(b) The articles of incorporation may include: 
EXPLANATION: CAPITALS INDICATE MATTER ADDED TO EX-
ISTING LAW; [Brackets] indicate matter deleted from existing law. 
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(1) Any provision not inconsistent with law which defines, 
limits, or regulates the powers of the corporation, its directors and stock-
holders, any class of its stockholders, or the holders of any bonds, notes, 
or other securities which it may issue; 
(2) Any restriction not inconsistent· with law on the transfera-
bility of stock of any class; 
(3) Any provision authorized by this article to be included in 
the bylaws; 
(4) Any provision which requires for any purpose the concur-
rence of a greater proportion of the votes of all classes or of any class of 
stock than the proportion required by this article for that purpose; 
(5) A provision which requires for any purpose a lesser pro-
portion of the votes of all classes or of any class of stock than the propor-
tion required by this article for that purpose, but this proportion may not 
be less than a majority of all the votes entitled to be cast on the matter; 
(6) A provision which divides its directors into classes and 
specifies the term of office of each class; [and] 
(7) A provision for minority representation through cumula-
tive voting in the election of directors and the terms on which cumulative 
voting rights may be exercised; AND 
(8) A PROVISION WHICH VARIES IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH § 2-405.2(A) OF THIS TITLE THE STANDARDS FOR LIA-
BILITY OF THE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF A CORPORA-
TION FOR MONEY DAMAGES. 
2-405.1. 
(c) A person who performs his duties in accordance with the stan-
dard provided in this section has no liability by reason of being or having 
been a director of a corporation[, unless, in a situation to which § 2-
419( d) of this subtitle applies, a contract or transaction is determined not 
to have been fair and reasonable to the corporation]. 
2-405.2. 
(A) THE CHARTER OF THE CORPORATION MAY IN-
CLUDE ANY PROVISION EXPANDING OR LIMITING THE LI-
ABILITY OF ITS DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS TO THE 
CORPORATION OR ITS STOCKHOLDERS FOR MONEY DAM-
AGES BUT MAY NOT INCLUDE ANY PROVISION WHICH RE-
STRICTS OR LIMITS THE LIABILITY OF ITS DIRECTORS OR 
OFFICERS TO THE CORPORATION OR ITS STOCKHOLDERS: 
(1) TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS PROVED THAT THE 
PERSON ACTUALLY RECEIVED AN IMPROPER BENEFIT OR 
PROFIT IN MONEY, PROPERTY, OR SERVICES, FOR THE 
AMOUNT OF THE BENEFIT OR PROFIT IN MONEY, PROP-
ERTY, OR SERVICES ACTUALLY RECEIVED; 
(2) TO THE EXTENT THAT A JUDGMENT OR OTHER 
FINAL ADJUDICATION ADVERSE TO THE PERSON IS EN-
TERED IN A PROCEEDING BASED ON A FINDING IN THE 
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PROCEEDING T.HAT THE PERSON'S ACTION, OR FAILURE 
TO ACT, WAS THE RESULT OF ACTIVE AND DELIBERATE 
DISHONESTY AND WAS MATERIAL TO THE CAUSE OF AC-
TION ADJUDICATED IN THE PROCEEDING; OR 
(3) WITH RESPECT TO ANY ACTION DESCRIBED IN 
SUBSECTION (B) OF THIS SECTION. 
(B) THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO AN ACTION 
BROUGHT BY OR ON BEHALF OF A STATE GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTITY, RECEIVER, CONSERVATOR, OR DEPOSITOR 
AGAINST A DIRECTOR OR OFFICER OF: 
(1) A BANKING INSTITUTION AS DEFINED IN § 1-
101 OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARTICLE; 
(2) A CREDIT UNION AS DESCRIBED IN § 6-201 OF 
THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARTICLE; 
(3) A SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION AS DE-
FINED IN § 8-101 OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARTI-
CLE; OR 
(4) A SUBSIDIARY OF A BANKING INSTITUTION, 
CREDIT UNION, OR SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION DE-
SCRIBED IN THIS SUBSECTION. 
(C) THIS SECTION MAY NOT BE CONSTRUED TO AF-
FECT THE LIABILITY OF A PERSON IN ANY CAPACITY 
OTHER THAN THE PERSON'S CAPACITY AS A DIRECTOR OR 
OFFICER. 
2-418. 
(b)(1) A corporation may indemnify any director made a party to 
any proceeding by reason of service in that capacity [if the director: 
(i) Acted in good faith; 
(ii) Reasonably believed: 
1. In the case of conduct in the director's official ca-
pacity with the corporation, that the conduct was in the best interests of 
the corporation; and 
2. In all other cases, that the conduct was at least 
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation; and] UNLESS IT IS 
PROVED THAT: 
(I) THE ACT OR OMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR 
WAS MATERIAL TO THE CAUSE OF ACTION ADJUDICATED 
IN THE PROCEEDING; AND 
1. WAS COMMITTED IN BAD FAITH; OR 
2. WAS THE RESULT OF ACTIVE AND DE-
LIBERATE DISHONESTY; OR 
(II) THE DIRECTOR ACTUALLY RECEIVED AN 
IMPROPER PERSONAL BENEFIT IN MONEY, PROPERTY, OR 
SERVICES; OR 
(iii) In the case of any criminal proceeding, THE DI-
1989] Origins of the D&O Statute 275 
RECTOR had [no] reasonable cause to believe that the [conduct] ACT 
OR OMISSION was unlawful. 
(2)(i) Indemnification may be against judgments, penalties, 
fines, settlements, and reasonable expenses actually incurred by the direc-
tor in connection with the proceeding. 
(ii) However, if the proceeding was one by or in the right 
of the corporation, indemnification [may be made only against reasonable 
expenses and] may not be made in respect of any proceeding in which the 
director shall have been adjudged to be liable to the corporation. 
(3)(1) The termination of any proceeding by judgment, order 
OR settlement[, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its 
equivalent creates a rebuttable] DOES NOT CREATE A presumption 
that the director did not meet the requisite standard of conduct set forth 
in this subsection. 
(II) THE TERMINATION OF ANY PROCEEDING 
BY CONVICTION, OR A PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE OR ITS 
EQUIVALENT, OR AN ENTRY OF AN ORDER OF PROBATION 
PRIOR TO JUDGMENT, CREATES A REBUTTABLE PRESUMP-
TION THAT THE DIRECTOR DID NOT MEET THAT STAN-
DARD OF CONDUCT. 
(e)(l) Indemnification under subsection (b) of this section may not 
be made by the corporation unless authorized [in the specific case] FOR 
A SPECIFIC PROCEEDING after a determination has been made that 
indemnification of the director is permissible in the circumstances be-
cause the director has met the standard of conduct set forth in subsection 
(b) of this section. 
(f)(l) Reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a party to 
a proceeding may be paid or reimbursed by the corporation in advance of 
the final disposition of the proceeding[, after a determination that the 
facts then known to those making the determination would not preclude 
indemnification under this section,] upon receipt by the corporation of: 
(i) A written affirmation by the director of the director's 
good faith belief that the standard of conduct necessary for indemnifica-
tion by the corporation as authorized in this section has been met; and 
(ii) A written undertaking by or on behalf of the director 
to repay the amount if it shall ultimately be determined that the standard 
of conduct has not been met. 
(2) The undertaking required by subparagraph (ii) of para-
graph (1) of this subsection shall be an unlimited general obligation of 
the director but need not be secured and may be accepted without refer-
ence to financial ability to make the repayment. 
(3) [Determinations and authorizations of payments] PAY-
MENTS under this subsection shall be [in the manner] MADE AS PRO-
VIDED BY THE CHARTER, BYLAWS, OR CONTRACT OR AS 
specified in subsection (e) of this section. 
(g) [A provision for the corporation to indemnify a director who is 
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made a party to a proceeding, whether contained in] THE INDEMNIFI-
CATION AND ADVANCEMENT OF EXPENSES PROVIDED OR 
AUTHORIZED BY THIS SECTION MAY NOT BE DEEMED EX-
CLUSIVE OF ANY OTHER RIGHTS, BY INDEMNIFICATION 
OR OTHERWISE, TO WHICH A DIRECTOR MAY BE ENTITLED 
UNDER the charter, the bylaws, a resolution of stockholders or direc-
tors, an agreement or otherwise, [except as contemplated by subsection 
(k) of this section, is not valid unless consistent with this section or, to 
the extent that indemnity under this section is limited by the charter, 
consistent with the charter] BOTH AS TO ACTION IN AN OFFI-
CIAL CAPACITY AND AS TO ACTION IN ANOTHER CAPAC-
ITY WHILE HOLDING SUCH OFFICE. 
(k)(l) A corporation may purchase and maintain insurance on be-
half of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee, or agent of 
the corporation, or who, while a director, officer, employee, or agent of 
the corporation, is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a 
director, officer, partner, trustee, employee, or agent of another foreign 
or domestic corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, other enter-
prise, or employee benefit plan against any liability asserted against and 
incurred by such person in any such capacity or arising out of such per-
son's position, whether or not the corporation would have the power to 
indemnify against liability under the provisions of this section. 
(2) A CORPORATION MAY PROVIDE SIMILAR PRO-
TECTION, INCLUDING A TRUST FUND, LETTER OF CREDIT, 
OR SURETY BOND, NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS 
SECTION. 
(3) THE INSURANCE OR SIMILAR PROTECTION 
MAY BE PROVIDED BY A SUBSIDIARY OR AN AFFILIATE OF 
THE CORPORATION. 
SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That the pro-
visions of§§ 2-104(b)(8) and 2-405.2 of the Corporations and Associa-
tions Article added by this Act shall apply only to actions arising from 
events or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this Act, 
and that, except as provided in Section 3 of this Act, the amendments to 
§ 2-418 of the Corporations and Associations Article added by this Act 
shall apply only to indemnification granted on or after the effective date 
of this Act, whether the events, omissions, or proceedings underlying the 
indemnification occurred before or after the effective date of this Act. 
SECTION 3. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That with re-
spect to a banking institution, credit union, or savings and loan associa-
tion described in this Act, or a subsidiary of a banking institution, credit 
union, or savings and loan association described in this Act, the amend-
ments to Section 2-418 of the Corporations and Associations Article ad-
ded by this Act shall apply only to indemnification granted on or after 
the effective date of this Act for events, omissions or proceedings occur-
ring after the effective date of this Act. 
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SECTION 4. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act 
is an emergency measure, is necessary for the immediate preservation of 
the public health and safety, has been passed by a yea and nay vote sup-
ported by three-fifths of all the members elected to each of the two 
Houses of the General Assembly, and shall take effect from the date it is 
enacted. 
Approved February 18, 1988. 
